The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters
Volume 47
Number 4 Parameters WInter 2017

Article 8

Winter 11-1-2017

Deterrence & Security Assistance: The South China Sea
Tommy Ross

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, International and Intercultural Communication
Commons, Military and Veterans Studies Commons, Military History Commons, Military, War, and Peace
Commons, National Security Law Commons, Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration
Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons,
Political History Commons, Public Administration Commons, Public Affairs Commons, Public History
Commons, Public Policy Commons, and the United States History Commons

Recommended Citation
Tommy Ross, "Deterrence & Security Assistance: The South China Sea," Parameters 47, no. 4 (2017):
63-74, doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3104.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

Regional Challenges

Deterrence & Security Assistance:
The South China Sea
Tommy Ross
©2018 Tommy Ross

ABSTRACT: This article identifies how the United States can apply
security assistance to support regional security in the South China
Sea in order to counter China’s assertive expansion strategy.

A

s China continues to emerge as a global leader, its ambitions
to redefine the global order and challenge existing geopolitical
power dynamics will ensure that, whether or not President
Donald Trump and his administration so choose, the focal point of
US foreign policy will continue its migration east. And—given the
complexities of the history, overlapping cultural and ideological claims,
economic dimensions, and geography—the South China Sea is likely to
be the proving ground that brings the Trump administration some of its
most vexing, and consequential, foreign policy tests.
A successful approach to China must carefully balance national
security, economic, cultural, and ethical policy priorities of the United
States, which include but are not limited to those at stake in the South
China Sea. Yet, there is no question a more assertive military and
defense posture in the South China Sea is sorely needed, particularly as
a complement to sustained diplomacy.
The Obama administration began dipping its toes in these fraught
waters as part of its “Rebalance” strategy; the Trump administration
has an opportunity to expand US military engagement in the region
to generate far more consequential outcomes by strengthening regional
coalitions and deterring China’s frequent provocations. Key to a more
effective regional military engagement will be a more sophisticated and
robust approach to security assistance.

Regional Significance

While other challenges such as North Korea’s nuclearization or the
Islamic State’s metastasis may pose a more immediate and direct threat
to US security, the emergence of China—the world’s most populous
nation and second-largest economy—as a world power will be far more
consequential for the long-term economic and security prospects of the
United States. The critical question during this emergence is whether
China will responsibly contribute to the existing international order or
aggressively seek to subvert it. The South China Sea has emerged as the
arena in which that question is most consistently and tangibly tested.
China’s activities in the South China Sea can directly impact US
interests in the region and serve as proxy for broader global concerns.
These activities undermine the international order and the legal
architecture, which serves as an organizing construct and stabilizing
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force in support of international trade, law enforcement, conflict
resolution, and diplomacy. This strategy is by no means limited to the
South China Sea, but it does reach its fullest expression there.
Territorial encroachments could enable China to impose conditions
on economic activity in the South China Sea, through which over $5
trillion in trade transits each year. We have already seen China press
such advantages to enact economic punishments on its neighbors.1
China’s action to militarize contested features within the region extends
their defensive perimeter several hundred miles beyond their borders,
an enviable advantage in any potential military conflict. While US
strategy should not be driven solely by military considerations, given the
aggressive actions and rhetoric China has directed toward Japan, Taiwan,
and other nations, ignoring such considerations would be foolish.
China’s diplomatic, economic, and military actions in the South
China Sea have a dual impact. They directly affect US interests in the
region, and they serve as proxies for China’s broader efforts to challenge
and to undermine the accepted and stable international frameworks
around the globe. Regardless of the strategic value to the United States
per se, China’s pursuits matter greatly to America’s key allies and partners
in the region. For that reason alone, China’s actions in the South China
Sea ought to be a priority for the United States, lest America risk further
slippage in its regional standing as a great power, security guarantor, and
valuable trading partner.
For allies in the region, such as Thailand and the Philippines, as
well as key emerging partners, such as Indonesia and Vietnam, the
South China Sea presents nearly existential crises. It is a place where
the Chinese military and coast guard—as well as civilian “blue-hulled”
paramilitary units in the Chinese maritime militia—harass the region’s
citizens, disrupt maritime economic activity, and press territorial claims
they view with historic justification. For other key allies and partners
outside the immediate region—such as Japan, Australia, and India—the
region matters as a potential platform for Chinese aggression as well as
the commercial risks of closed or constrained trade routes. If the United
States is unable to exert leadership on the priority concerns voiced by
these key regional actors, the actors’ willingness to support American
priorities will diminish.
China’s encroachments are thus an assault on US leadership across
Asia, succeeding in not only undermining America’s relationships
with key allies and partners but also turning these parties against each
other. Recent moves by Vietnam and the Philippines to strengthen
their bilateral ties with China, as well as renewed sparring between the
two, indicate this pattern. As a result, America’s global network of likeminded partners, which the recently released National Defense Strategy
calls “crucial to our strategy, providing a durable, asymmetric strategic
advantage that no competitor or rival can match,” is eroding.2

1      AFP, “China Blocked Exports of Rare Earth Metals to Japan, Traders Claim,” Telegraph,
September 24, 2010.
2      US Department of Defense (DoD), The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:
2018 (Washington, DC: DoD, 2018).
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Strategic Gaps

Successive administrations have sought to assert US leadership in
Asia and to respond to China’s destabilizing actions through a holistic
set of policies that extend far beyond the security realm. Perhaps the
most consequential long-term policies within the Asia-Pacific region are
economic, and how the Trump administration positions the United States
after withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and maneuvers
around China’s ambitions for a regional trading arrangement will be
a crucial determinant. Nimble diplomacy is also critical to a successful
strategy. Broad and sustained efforts, such as seeking resolutions for the
region’s many territorial disputes, as well as narrower concern toward
such pursuits as a constructive course with Philippine President Rodrigo
Duterte, offer important avenues for influencing regional actors.
Such initiatives, however, are not sufficient for the United States to
remain a critical guarantor of security or the premier security partner
in the region. Ultimately, a strong regional security coalition bound by
common objectives and committed to common action is required to
prevent Chinese coercion from dissolving the rules-based order that
prevents an every-country-for-itself approach to territorial disputes,
which could potentially end in broad military conflict. In the near term,
therefore, America’s security policy in the Asia-Pacific region must play
a robust supporting role, even if it does not occupy center stage.
The Obama administration undertook a significant rebalance in
the military realm, investing in a multifaceted approach to promote
partnerships in the area, deter Chinese aggression, and maintain
American leadership. These investments were weighted toward efforts
largely too esoteric for, or invisible to, regional citizenries and even, to
some degree, their governments. The Defense Department, for example,
reshaped its long-term development and acquisition strategy, led by the
Third Offset, to focus on high-end military capabilities that maintain
US superiority over near-peer adversaries. This strategy also seeks to
counter anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies used by China and
others. The US military has also focused on developing new operational
concepts such as the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the
Global Commons and other efforts of the Strategic Capabilities Office,
often praised by Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter.
While critical to America’s ability to win future wars, these efforts
do little to visibly demonstrate America’s presence or leadership in
the region. Moreover, when states such as China rapidly change the
political and geographical landscape by reclaiming features and taking
other actions in the South China Sea, long-term, less visible military
capabilities will arrive too late. Indeed, the mismatch between American
and Chinese strategies has challenged the United States and its regional
partners to manage the situation daily. As Dr. Ross Babbage notes in a
recent report, “Beijing has employed a very sophisticated strategy and
operational concept that could be implemented without challenging US
alliance commitments or directly confronting U.S. or allied forces.”3 His
diagnosis is scathing:
3      Ross Babbage, Countering China’s Adventurism in the South China Sea: Strategy Options for the United
States and Its Allies (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2017), 30.
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Western governments have lacked a coherent strategy or game plan for
achieving well-defined allied goals. Their actions in response to Beijing’s
assertive steps have almost always been reactive, involve very limited and
highly predictable activities in domains determined by the Chinese, and
could be readily ignored by Beijing. The result has been that the Western
allies have passed the initiative and momentum to Beijing, ceded a large
area of strategically important maritime territory, acquiesced to a flouting
of international law, and repeatedly conveyed an impression of weak allied
will, distraction, and disorganization.4

There will surely be disagreement about the degree of Babbage’s
criticism, but its overall message is hard to argue. What the United States
has largely lacked is a strategy that, on one hand, provides a consistent
and visible reminder of US commitment to the region that keeps the
Chinese military off-balance while, on the other hand, avoids escalation
by avoiding direct confrontation with China or impinging upon its key
redlines. A more sophisticated strategy must include several elements
that range from creative options for military operations to expanded
information operations; particularly important is a more prominent and
sophisticated approach to security assistance.

Security Assistance in Southeast Asia

During peacetime, combatant commanders have three primary
tools to support visible regional engagement: posture, operations, and
security cooperation. The Rebalance enhanced each of these tools to
varying degrees. Posture and presence have been a main focus, with
the major expansion and reconfiguration of US force deployments in
the Asia-Pacific region. Freedom of Navigation operations and joint
patrols by the United States and its partner navies, have also become a
centerpiece of the US Pacific Command’s (USPACOM’s) presence in the
region. Security cooperation, however, remains the most underdeveloped
of these tools, and has tremendous potential for shaping the Asia-Pacific
theater to achieve US objectives.
While most effective when used in concert with other tools,
security cooperation maintains a range of benefits the other tools do
not. First, only through security cooperation—including the sale of
equipment, the provision of equipment and training, the enhancement
of critical institutions, and the continual exchange of concepts and
personnel—can the United States help partners measurably improve
their military capabilities. Able partners can diminish risk to US forces
and, at least partially, check China’s ability to exploit other partners’
weaknesses. Second, security cooperation is highly attractive because
of the benefits it brings to partners, and is therefore one of the most
effective tools for strengthening relationships and coalitions. Finally,
and critically in the Asia-Pacific region where misunderstandings
can quickly become flash points, security cooperation is generally far
less provocative and risk inducing than tools such as the Freedom of
Navigation operations. Security cooperation can work gradually and
broadly to reshape the region’s security environment without producing
single points of confrontation.
Yet, despite these benefits, the security assistance resources in the
region have been limited, and available resources have been applied in
4      Babbage, Countering China’s Adventurism.
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ways that largely failed to produce tangible advances toward US strategic
priorities. Looking upon the South China Sea, and its associated policy
challenges, with a fresh perspective, the new administration will find
a tremendous opportunity to apply security cooperation in the region
more effectively for near-term gains.

Current Assessment

Security assistance in Europe and the Middle East spiked in the
last fifteen years as a result of the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001; wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; Russia’s resurgent aggression; and
the constantly shifting landscape of extremism and insurgency in the
Middle East. Meanwhile, the Rebalance notwithstanding, the region’s
meager allotment of assistance resources has hardly changed.
The entire Asia-Pacific region, for example, generally receives about
one percent of the budget for Foreign Military Financing (FMF), the
State Department’s flagship security assistance program.5 In Fiscal Year
2015, the Southeast Asian countries that border the South China Sea
received $74.75 million from the program: the Philippines received $50
million, while Indonesia and Vietnam received the remaining allocation.6
On one hand, this amount represents a doubling of the region’s 2011
funding of $36.2 million.7 On the other hand, the total equates to the
program’s administrative costs.
Seeking to implement the Obama administration’s Rebalance
strategy, the State Department announced a few new regional
investments, including more FMF funding for Southeast Asian nations
and a $25 million Southeast Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative.
Moreover, late in Obama’s administration, Carter launched the
Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI), to remedy the neglect
and aimlessness that had characterized regional security assistance, and
to foster more visible engagement in the region. Promoted as a 5-year,
$425 million effort, MSI significantly increased US investments in the
region and more than doubled the annual Foreign Military Financing
program with the five primary partner nations of Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.8 This investment is important,
particularly as an indication of the Defense Department’s increased
commitment to the region. But even after these new investments, the
entire region still receives less security assistance funding than it did
when the Rebalance began.9
While funding totals are an important measure of security assistance,
their impact in the region should not only be measured by monetary
value but also by their impact on partners’ military capabilities, the
strength of bilateral and multilateral relationships, and the deterrence
5       Eddie Linczer, “The Role of Security Assistance in Washington’s Pivot to Southeast
Asia,” American Enterprise Institute (AEI), August 26, 2016, https://www.aei.org/publication
/the-role-of-security-assistance-in-washingtons-pivot-to-southeast-asia/.
6      US Department of State (DoS), Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs: Fiscal Year 2017 (Washington, DC: DoS, 2016).
7          “Foreign Military Financing Account Summary,” US Department of State, January 20, 2017,
https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14560.htm.
8          Linczer 2016. According to the AEI report, FMF expenditures for the five nations total $76
million per year; MSI will add an average of $85 million per year to that sum.
9      Council on Foreign Relations, “America’s Pivot to Asia Actually Led to Drop in Security
Assistance for Southeast Asia,” Huffington Post, July 7, 2017.
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of provocative behavior. In other words, security assistance should be
measured by how successfully it advances US national security strategy.
On that scale, America’s assistance in the region also has a mixed record.
Certainly there have been individual success stories. Counterterrorism assistance to the Filipino military’s long campaign against
the Abu Sayyaf Group in Mindanao is generally regarded as having
transformed Filipino special operations forces and delivered a strategic
victory against the militants. The National Coast Watch Center in
Manila has provided the Philippines with a potential platform to expand
its maritime domain awareness efforts across multiple government
agencies. And Defense Institution Reform Initiative efforts to support
the Indonesian Ministry of Defense as it enhances its defense strategy
and planning processes have made important strides.
Despite these success stories, there is little to suggest any overall
strategic direction. Modest assistance budgets have been divided across
a broad range of programs, each with a different objective. Administration budget justification materials and other data indicate
counterterrorism, counternarcotics, counterproliferation, military professionalization, and maritime law enforcement have all been priorities
funded through dozens of different programs and implementers.10
This approach thinly distributed funds while risking redundant or
contradictory programming. Moreover, that such investments have
rarely focused directly on the emergent key security challenges in the
region of Southeast Asia, stability and free commerce in the South China
Sea, creates a sense of strategic aimlessness.

A New Strategy

Neglect and aimlessness will not deliver the strategic outcomes
our security interests in the region demand. A new approach is needed.
While the amount of resources devoted to the effort is important, the
most critical factor is ultimately the strategy driving security cooperation
in the region. America’s military engagements with, and assistance to,
partners in Southeast Asia must be driven by a coherent medium- to longterm strategy that understands and accounts for objectives, motivations,
and vulnerabilities of China and partner nations. Like other military
preparations, such planning must address scenarios based on potential
reactions by regional stakeholders or other developments. Such planning
must also include thoughtful approaches to strategic communications
with partners that are not always strategically aligned with US
objectives as well as stakeholders, like China, that may misunderstand
America’s intentions.
The building blocks for such an approach exist in the form of
collaborative programs such as MSI, extensive analysis of regional
stakeholders and security challenges, growing interest among partners
in achieving a just and stable regional order, and bipartisan, interagency
commitment to the effort. A handful of practical, feasible steps could

10      See, DoS, Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs, Fiscal Year 2018 (Washington, DC: DoS, 2017); DoD, FY 2016 Section 1211(a) Report to
Congress on DoD Assistance to Foreign Security Forces (Washington, DC: DoD, 2016); and additional
assistance data available at www.ForeignAssistance.gov.
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transform US engagement in the region and dramatically improve the
return on our security assistance investments.

Strategic Security Assistance

First, security assistance must be reoriented to focus far more sharply
on specific, strategic results. The United States should endeavor to
deliver capabilities to partners, especially those that might complicate or
replicate China’s A2/AD capabilities that could be reasonably employed
during a regional contingency. This focus cannot, as it has previously,
prioritize delivering hardware and neglect developing institutional
capabilities, such as personnel management and logistics systems, that are
vital to successfully employing such hardware. America’s assistance must
be planned to deliver truly viable capabilities rather than just showpiece
equipment. Surely our potential adversaries can discern the difference.
Such assistance should be informed by careful analysis of potential
contingencies, including possible US military responses, to identify
realistic roles for partners’ militaries. Partner nations bordering the
South China Sea region are in most cases smaller, less sophisticated,
and often oriented toward a narrower range of missions. These partners
may not be capable of defeating China in a direct conflict, but they can
contribute meaningfully to contingency operations. A regional network
of interoperable capabilities can form the basis of an effective military
coalition. Moreover, specific capabilities can complicate an adversary’s
war plans by denying or challenging access, enabling other actors (like
the United States) through logistics and intelligence support, defending
key infrastructure, and delaying enemy advances until help can arrive. If
improved partner capabilities accomplish one or more of these objectives,
the chances of a successful US or coalition contingency operation
increase substantially and risk to US forces diminishes. Capabilities
that can expand the range of America’s options for overcoming China’s
A2/AD capabilities would have a significant impact, and assistance
efforts should be targeted there.
In addition, Pacific Command stands to realize significant strategic
gains by more carefully considering the timing and messaging that
accompanies assistance, particularly in relation to provocative actions by
China. Take, for example, the construction of airfield infrastructure for
a partner air force, which might be used by US fighters in a contingency.
Such assistance addresses logistics requirements vital for successful
contingency operations, which is beneficial to the partner and the United
States. How much more of a strategic impact would the construction of
an airfield have, though, if it were framed as a direct response to, and
initiated within weeks of, the groundbreaking of Chinese reclamation
activities on a contested feature of the South China Sea? Timing, a
variable US assistance efforts have largely ignored, is critical.

Relevant Capacity-Building

During a contingency, China’s worst nightmare might not be the full
and unbridled firepower of the American military but an interoperable
and effective coalition of American and regional militaries, seamlessly
integrating their infrastructure and capabilities into synchronized
action. The demonstration of such coordination and interoperability
during peacetime, therefore, should serve as a powerful deterrent against
TOC
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potential Chinese provocations. Yet the truth is, our partners in Southeast Asia are not interoperable—not with the United States, not with
each other—nor are they currently capable of effective coalition action.
Pacific Command should increase its focus on the intersection of
security assistance and real-world operations, building regional capacity
for coalition warfare and exercising key capabilities and operational
concepts. In practice, such an effort would not simply entail more or
larger multilateral exercises but creative approaches to engagements
that generate more frequent and more robust bilateral and multilateral
operations in the South China Sea and in other key maritime regions.
For instance, joint patrols, either by the United States and one
or more partners or by multiple partners without the United States,
develop interoperability and habits of collaboration while enhancing
maritime domain awareness and law enforcement in areas of mutual
interest. Recently, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines agreed to
conduct such coordinated patrols in the Sulu Sea, which is an area
abutting the South China Sea that has seen significant threats from
pirate and militant groups.11 The United States has a substantial interest
in fostering this collaboration and could provide direct assistance to
the mission, particularly in the form of intelligence or logistics support.
Coast guards and navies from each partner may also need assistance
deepening interoperability and extending time at sea. Targeting security
assistance toward this mission would create an immediate impact, while
building the foundation for future multilateral collaboration.
America would also benefit by working with regional partners
to develop multilateral frameworks that institutionalize regional
collaboration. Successful examples of this approach abound in the
context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, where members
have increasingly pooled limited resources to achieve shared capabilities.
The Movement Coordination Center Europe (MCCE), for instance,
helps partners coordinate strategic lift assets to maximize efficiency and
cost savings. In concrete terms, the coordination allows one nation to
ship supplies on the plane or vessel of another member nation if there
is available space.12 Other examples range from the Alliance Ground
Surveillance system—a similar consortium pooling intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets—to combining the resources of
multiple member nations to purchase US weapons technologies.
These models offer a compelling path for Southeast Asian nations
to tackle shared challenges in a cost-efficient manner while reducing
operating costs and providing a platform for deepening interoperability
and trust. Given the immense logistical challenges associated with
responding to events, such as humanitarian disasters or terrorist attacks,
across thousands of islands and thousands of miles, developing a shared
logistics initiative along the lines of MCCE should take top priority.
Finally, exercises should play an important role but repeating the
same annual exercises with no apparent strategic rationale is unlikely to
pay strategic dividends. As much as broad-based exercises such as the Rim
11      Arlina Arshad, “Jakarta, KL and Manila To Start Joint Patrols in Sulu Sea,” Straits Times
(Singapore), August 5, 2016.
12     “Welcome,” Movement Coordination Centre Europe, January 16, 2018, http://mcce-mil.com.
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of the Pacific and Cobra Gold can contribute to building relationships,
more targeted exercises offer greater operational value. These exercises
offer an important platform to develop and test operational concepts and
should thus be framed according to specific assumptions about coalition
participants and scenarios. Exercises also often bring opportunities
to develop necessary infrastructure and deepen knowledge about key
areas of operation. Furthermore, such exercises offer an opportunity
to demonstrate new capabilities in the region. While the US military
has rarely taken such an approach, it certainly deserves a place in the
commander’s playbook as a tool for deterrence or strategic messaging.

Provocation Planning

A playbook containing a range of realistic options for responding
to potential scenarios is becoming increasingly important for Admiral
Harry B. Harris Jr., the commander of US Pacific Command. As China’s
provocations become increasingly frequent and aggressive, Harris and
his leadership at the Defense Department and in the White House need
a robust set of options to allow the United States to respond in ways
that uphold the international rule of law, reassure allies and partners of
US resolve, and deter future provocations. While this playbook should
include a diverse range of tools, there is great and unrealized potential
for refining tools that involve assistance to and collaboration with
partners. Such engagement-focused tools are often, though not always,
less escalatory and, given the common resolve they demonstrate, may
have more impact.
A variety of such options drawing on the concepts articulated above
should be further developed to expand the commander’s playbook.
Joint patrols are one such option discussed repeatedly at USPACOM
headquarters, and some steps have been taken to expand such efforts.13
However, sufficient partner capability and interoperability necessary for
joint patrols often lags well behind ambitions. Rather than continuing to
discuss joint patrols as a hypothetical possibility, Pacific Command should
accelerate efforts to prepare partners for participating in such patrols. In
addition to providing important elements of required assistance such as
patrol boats and equipment—particularly interoperable communications
equipment—US assistance must also emphasize operator and unit
training, logistics and maintenance support, and bilateral exercises that
put operating concepts into practice.
Joint patrols require commencing capacity-building activities
now to ensure partners will be capable of participating in such patrols
when desired in the future. Other tools could be available without
such capacity-building; however, the United States should undertake
additional planning and analysis to ensure such resources can be
employed in an effective and timely manner. Building upon the previous
example, the Seabees or other military engineering units could easily
construct an airfield or a small port facility, but the impact of such action

13      Harry B. Harris Jr., “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Adm. Harris in the Pentagon
Briefing Room,” US Pacific Command, February 25, 2016, http://www.pacom.mil/Media
/Speeches-Testimony/Article/673521/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-adm-harris-in
-the-pentagon-briefing-room/; HQ Pacific Air Forces Public Affairs, “PACAF Airmen Stand up Air
Contingent in Philippines,” US Pacific Command, April 18, 2016, http://www.pacom.mil/Media
/Article/723604/pacaf-airmen-stand-up-air-contingent-in-philippines/; and David B. Larter,
“Carrier Group Returns to South China Sea Amid Tensions,” Navy Times, April 14, 2016.
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would increase dramatically if undertaken in direct response to China
militarizing a contested feature.
Executing such an activity requires planning now by identifying
preferred locations, securing permissions from partner nations,
and developing concrete concepts of operations for executing and
messaging the activity. Another powerful option for the playbook
might be conducting a “snap” exercise, in which US forces carry out
an unscheduled training demonstration with little warning. Given the
provocative nature of snap exercises, they, too, require careful planning.
Still, as China’s activities become more aggressive, the commander’s
playbook must be filled with a spectrum of fully developed, executable
options to match a variety of scenarios.

Army Involvement

Admittedly, the new approaches discussed heretofore are not easy,
and they are made all the more challenging by the need for partners to
commit, with the United States, to these courses of action. A shared
sense of commitment cannot be taken for granted among a group of
diverse nations who each has a history of uneasy relations with the
United States. However, what is clearly a challenge can too easily become
an excuse. Partnerships are forged through consistent engagement and
through exploration of mutual interests and benefit. Many Southeast
Asian partners would likely argue that the United States has too often
sought to leverage regional nations to advance US interests without
fully considering the strategic objectives and priorities of the nations
themselves. To overcome relationship challenges, the US should work
to identify priorities shared by partners, avoiding a mismatch between
US and partner commitments.
Whether intentional or not, Pacific Command’s engagement in
the region has often represented such a mismatch. With a focus on the
maritime arena, US Navy and Marine Corps forces, along with their
regional counterparts, have inadvertently become the dominant players
in the region. Pacific Command has also prioritized engagement between
US and partner air forces. Left out, particularly in maritime security
engagements and assistance, have been the region’s armies, despite the
fact that the army is the dominant military service in each of the primary
regional partners.
Meanwhile, there is a growing recognition that the Army’s role in
confronting Chinese provocations and responding to a contingency must
expand. In fact, Harris has commented, “I think the army should be in
the business of sinking ships with land-based surface-to-ship missile
systems . . . What the Army brings traditionally is what they always bring,
which is mass and firepower and capability.”14 Yet, as the Army works to
expand its role in the region, there has been little recognition that these
same capabilities—mass and firepower based ashore but aimed at the
sea—could be contributed by partner armies in the region as easily as by
the Army itself. Ideally, a warfighting coalition would demonstrate the
same interoperability and scope of partner contributions in the armies’
domain as demonstrated by the other services.

14      Franz-Stefan Gady, “US Admiral: US Army Needs to Create Ship-Killing Units for South
China Sea,” Diplomat, November 17, 2016.
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Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., in his Foreign Affairs article “How to
Deter China,” detailed a concept for establishing coastal defenses around
the South China Sea that notably recognizes the role partners might
play.15 While Krepinevich’s specific vision has its opponents, it points
the way to an assistance initiative with partners that would be attractive
to their army-dominated militaries and, as Krepinevich notes, align with
investments many partners have already signaled they intend to make.
Krepinevich even identifies specific systems, such as coastal radars, shortrange interceptor missiles, and short-range, precision-guided rockets and
mortars. Likewise, Harris named high mobility artillery rocket systems
and Paladin howitzers as two systems US forces might deploy to the
region, and there is no reason they should not be considered for transfer
to foreign partners. One of the key benefits of expanding engagement
with regional armies in support of a coastal defense mission is that many
of these systems are in relatively wide circulation globally and thus can
feasibly be shared without the significant technology security hurdles
that complicate many foreign weapons transfers.
In addition to building coastal defense capacity, the Army can play a
leading role in executing each of the concepts discussed above. Already,
the Army’s innovative Pacific Pathways program has proven to be an
effective tool for rotating Army units through the region. The Army
should consider how that program and other regular exercises might be
used for more strategic purposes, such as training partners in coastal
defense operations or demonstrating new operational capabilities.
Additional potential resides in reorienting the Army National Guard’s
State Partnership Programs in the region to undertake more operationally
relevant activities, such as joint intelligence collection missions or
amphibious warfare trainings, with their host counterparts.

Military Diplomacy

Forging the depth of partnership required to support a more
sophisticated US regional strategy will require substantially enhancing
military diplomacy in the region in addition to increasing the focus on
regional armies. Under Carter’s leadership as the Secretary of Defense,
the Defense Department took several important steps in this direction,
notably through Carter personally and persistently engaging in forums
like the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM-Plus) and the
Shangri-La Dialogue. Secretary of Defense James Mattis began his
tenure by traveling to the Asia-Pacific region, signaling he understands
the importance of continuing these partnerships. Continued, and
additional, engagement at all levels will be important to nurturing such
relationships throughout the region.
Additionally, Pacific Command should look for opportunities to
elevate the level of bilateral staff talks, not only to signal the importance
of each partner in the region but also to help break through the respective
bureaucracies to secure commitments for new initiatives. Annual naval
staff talks, for example, are held by the US Seventh Fleet and include
key partners from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore.
Elevating these talks from the Seventh Fleet to the Pacific Fleet—in
essence, elevating the partnership from the three-star to the four-star

15      Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., “How to Deter China,” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 3 (March/April
2015), 78–86.
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level—could pay significant dividends in terms of partners’ perceptions
and US access to key leaders. Each service’s approach to bilateral staff
talks across the region varies, but all include opportunities to expand
and to elevate these engagements with key partners.
As China continues to escalate provocative behavior in the region,
a robust playbook representing options that are feasible and cover a
spectrum of scale, risk, and method will be essential for the commander
of USPACOM, the secretary of defense, and the president. The strategic
approach presented above provides a series of related and mutually
reinforcing concepts rather than a selection of limited choices to fill
out that playbook.
To summarize, a more sophisticated approach to security
cooperation in the region brings four valuable benefits: low cost,
international engagement, limited risk of escalation, and expansion of
military options. Partnerships that distribute contributions to regional
security cost the US less than other strategies. Empowering other nations
in the region to participate in their security engages them in forging
regional solutions that align with their strategic objectives and priorities
and strengthen regional security architectures. Such solutions also
allow the United States to act decisively without haphazardly escalating
tensions. Finally, well-targeted capacity-building investments will create
additional military options for the US and partners in future scenarios,
improving America’s strategic position. The approach detailed here is
only one part—and indeed not the most important part—of a broader
strategy required not only for the region but also to address global
concerns about China’s assertiveness. Yet, if the United States fails to
adopt a more strategic approach to engagements with regional partners
and allies, it will be ceding key ground to a China that is clearly asserting
its ambitions in the region and beyond.
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